We construct an n-period, constrained optimization model where the authoritarian ruler maximizes expected rents subject to budget constraint of available surplus. We show that the larger state capacity is in the previous period, the worse environmental quality will be in the next period: while infrastructural investment and environmental protection increase with state capacity, the former increases at a faster rate which enlarges the gap between the two-the environmental investment gap. Given infrastructural public goods typically damage the environment, the larger this gap is the worse the environmental quality would be. This follows from rulers' optimizing logic of equating marginal returns once we assume the declining marginal productivity of factors of production of surplus. We model three types of air and water pollutants in autocracies as a function of state capacity and other relevant variables. State capacity is associated with higher levels of all three types of pollutants.
Introduction
In 1980, 55.9% of the world population lived under some form of authoritarian rule. By 2000, after waves of democratization, this number was still as high as 42.1%. 1 How does authoritarian politics affect countries' environmental performances? This is an important and yet unanswered question for students of political science. Previous research on the environmental impact of political institutions often focuses on the democracy-non-democracy divide (Congleton, 1992; Li & Reuveny, 2006) . Some have argued that liberal-democracy could be detrimental to environmental protection (Dryzek, 1987; Midlarsky, 1998) . More recent research seems to suggest that democracies are often associated with more stringent environmental regulations and sometimes better environmental outcomes (Barret & Graddy, 2000; Bernauer & Koubi, 2009; Esty & Porter, 2005) . However, given the fact that different kinds of authoritarianism differ from each other as much as they differ from democracy (Geddes, 1999) , we need to further investigate the dynamics of environmental politics in the authoritarian world.
Unfortunately, we know little about environmental politics in authoritarian systems. This is understandable because the types of political institutions often studied by students of social sciences are usually missing from authoritarian politics. For instance, political economy models of electoral rules (proportional representation vs. majoritarian) and democratic political regimes (presidential vs. parliamentary system) have informed the recent environmental politics literature that connects these formal institutions to environmental policy outputs and outcomes (Broz & Maliniak, 2011; Fredriksson & Millimet, 2004; Fredriksson & Wollscheid, 2007) . However, these models are based on democratic politics and therefore provide little help when it comes to understand the dynamics of environmental politics in non-democratic systems.
Our understanding of politics in authoritarian systems is also much more limited than that of democratic systems. Recent literature on authoritarianism has focused on the classification of authoritarian regimes (Cheibub & Gandhi, 2004; Cheibub, Gandhi, & Vreeland, 2010; Geddes, 1999; Lai & Slater, 2006) and the links between these regime types and various phenomena such as regime survival (Geddes, 1999) , democratic transition and consolidation (Svolik, 2008) , economic development (Gandhi, 2008; Wright, 2008) , and initiation of conflicts (Pickering & Kisangani, 2010; Weeks, 2012) . Although there is an abundant case study literature on environmental regulations and outcomes in authoritarian systems (Doyle & Simpson, 2006; Economy, 2004; Mumme, Bath, & Assetto, 1988; Pryde, 1991) , unfortunately little systematic theoretical work has been carried out, and we lack systematic studies of how outcomes are related to variance among authoritarian systems.
In this article, we present a model of environmental politics in an authoritarian system starting with the basic assumption of a rent-maximizing authoritarian ruler. We construct an n-period, constrained optimization model where the authoritarian ruler maximizes expected rents subject to the budget constraint of the surplus that he has available in the short term. We show that it is typically the case that the larger state capacity is at time t, the worse environmental quality at time t + 1: strong state capacity increases infrastructural investment and environmental protection, but as long as the productivity of infrastructural investment relative to its price is greater than that of environmental protection, the former would increase at a faster rate, which enlarges the gap between the two. We call this the environmental investment gap. Based on the assumption that infrastructural public goods are typically provided in a way that damages the environment, we argue that the bigger the gap is, the worse environmental quality will be. This result follows from rulers' optimizing logic of equating marginal returns once we assume the declining marginal productivity of factors of production of surplus.
We test our theory by modeling three types of major air and water pollutants, sulfur dioxide (SO 2 ), carbon dioxide (CO 2 ), and biochemical oxygen demand (BOD) in authoritarian states as a function of the capacity of the state and a battery of relevant variables, for 1980-2003. The results strongly support our theory. Higher state capacity is associated with higher levels of all three types of pollutants. The rest of the article describes our theoretical model, presents data and variable operationalizations, and finally discusses the empirical findings and direction of future research.
A Model of Environmental Politics in Authoritarian States
Rulers can obtain surplus either by extracting part of the national income stream or by selling or running down parts of the national stock of capital that they control. In attempting to maximize the rents rulers in authoritarian regimes enjoy through monopoly of state power, they face a short-term and long-term trade-off. The surplus the authoritarian ruler (hereafter "ruler") has extracted at time t might be enjoyed as rent at that time. However, the ruler could invest it so as to enjoy higher future rents at t′ > t. First, the ruler can invest in capital which increases the size of future national income. Second, he can invest in additional state capacity, which will allow him to extract a greater surplus in the future. Third, he may make investments in legitimacy, which increases the probability that he will survive in office until the next time period. We discuss each of these forms of investment in turn.
Part of surplus is extracted from national income. National income is produced by labor, capital, infrastructural public goods, and environmental public goods. We assume a fixed supply of labor and capital in the hands of private owners. Positive investment by the ruler in infrastructural public goods such as roads and energy systems should increase future national income. However, a ruler might run down the stock of infrastructural capital to increase the rent he enjoys at t, with negative consequences for future national income. Infrastructural capital depreciates. One way of running it down is simply not to maintain it, for example, not to make road repairs. Environmental public goods are also important to production, and rulers can invest in future income by protecting them, through implementing environmental regulations. Again, a ruler can disinvest, pushing up the surplus he extracts in the short term at the cost of lower future income. For example, he may exploit national forests unsustainably, selling off the timber or allowing his cronies to do so, which we treat as an erosion of environmental protection.
We assume that the environmental quality at t is a function of the difference between the levels of infrastructural public goods and environmental protection in that period-the environmental investment gap. This is based on the assumption that infrastructural public goods are typically provided in a way that damages the environment. Of course this is not always true; for instance, a more efficient electricity distribution system enhances the environment. We simply bypass this issue by definition by categorizing such an investment as an environmental investment. Rulers control state capacity. If they invest in extra state capacity at t, other things equal, they should be able to enjoy higher future rents (Besley & Persson, 2010) . However, they may also disinvest. For instance, they could run down the size of the military and sell the assets freed up. Again this would allow them to enjoy higher rents in the short term.
In addition to controlling state capacity, authoritarian rulers-similar to their counterparts in democratic states-are interested in survival in office. Extant studies in fact suggest that because democratic leaders rely on a larger winning coalition for political survival compared with authoritarian rulers, incumbents in democracies tend to supply public rather than private goods to garner political support from members in the larger winning coalitions (Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, & Morrow, 2003; Lake & Baum, 2001) . This is because public goods by definition are supplied broadly, and it is relatively cheaper and more efficient for democratic leaders to provide such goods to their larger support base to prolong their survival in office at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on October 28, 2016 cps.sagepub.com Downloaded from (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003) . Unlike democratic leaders, rulers in authoritarian regimes often depend on support from a smaller winning coalition to retain power. Relying on support from a smaller winning coalition makes it more feasible and efficient for authoritarian rulers to provide private good transfers to narrow group of supporters to maximize their likelihood of political survival (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003) . As our model analyzes environmental politics in an authoritarian regime, we build on the studies mentioned above and assume that the (a) authoritarian ruler focuses on supplying private good transfers to his small core group of supporters and (b) the probability a ruler survives until the next time period increases with the amount he provides in private transfers to his supporters. Of course, such private good transfers cannot take negative values, because income is extracted from the generality of citizens, not the selectorate. We also assume that public good provision, whether infrastructural or environmental, does not increase the chances of survival. Public goods are available to a larger segment of the population in the selectorate and to those in the winning coalition, so they provide no particular motive for members in the smaller winning coalition to support the ruler. 2 The ruler plans investment over a finite number of periods 0 ≤ t ≤ T, where T ≥ 2 is the maximum period he believes he could possibly stay in office. T could be set by institutional rules, such as those governing succession in the Chinese Communist Party, or by beliefs about biological longevity. The ruler does not necessarily expect to survive this long in office, though. Denote the subjective probability that he will survive until time t by Π t , with Π 0 = 1, as the ruler is in office at the time of plan formulation. Let s t be the level of private good transfers to members of the selectorate at time t. Notice that a constraint (denoted as "C") on the ruler is such that
as we assume surplus is not extracted from the selectorate. The probability that the ruler survives from period t to period t + 1, 0 ≤ t < T will be denoted by π t , 0 < π t < 1, assumed to be a strictly increasing function of s t . 3 Furthermore, we assume Π t+1 = π t Π t , 0 ≤ t < T. Notice this is to treat survival between periods as a sequence of stochastically independent events.
Let the levels of infrastructural public goods, environmental protection, and state capacity at time t be I t , E t , and C t , respectively. Let investments at time t in these things be i t , e t , and c t , respectively. Recalling that the ruler can disinvest up to the point that all these factors are used up, the ruler also faces constraints:
Total levels of the three factors are accumulated through investment from t = 0. Thus, for instance, for t > 0,
Let Y t be the surplus that the ruler has extracted from national income at time t. Then a further constraint is that
where the price of private goods is 1, so they are the numeraire, and p I , p E , and p C are the prices of infrastructural public goods, environmental protection, and state capacity, respectively. Notice that if the ruler disinvests in infrastructure, say, this constraint becomes easier to satisfy. Implicitly, it allows for extraction from income and running down capital. This is an important technical feature of our model as it formally incorporates the dynamic from the literature of dictatorships that authoritarian rulers (unlike democratic leaders) are more likely to engage in "predation" in office that leads to income extraction and a decline in capital (e.g., H. Grossman & Noh, 1990; McGuire & Olson, 1996) .
Take Y o as given. For 0 < t ≤ T, we assume Y t depends on a Cobb-Douglas "surplus production function":
where A > 0 and 0 < α, β, γ < 1. Notice that α, β, and γ measure the productivity for the ruler's surplus of, respectively, infrastructure, environmental protection, and state capacity. Also notice that we assume that investments only affect surplus extracted in subsequent time periods.
The ruler's rent in period t is R t = Y t − (s t + p I i t + p E e t + p C c t ). Subject to constraints C1 through C5 above and initial investment stocks I 0 , E 0 , and C 0 , with discount parameter ϕ, 0 < ϕ < 1, he seeks to maximize discounted, expected rents over his maximum period in office:
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The fact that the authoritarian ruler in our model seeks to maximize his discounted rents is drawn from models of dictatorships which assume that "dictators want to maximize their rent" (Gandhi & Przeworski, 2006, p. 2 ; also see H. Grossman & Noh, 1990; Wintrobe, 1990) . The assumption of a rent-maximizing authoritarian ruler is distinct from models of trade or fiscal policymaking in democracies which typically assume that democratic incumbents maximize a weighted objective function in which the incumbent weighs social welfare and contributions from interest groups (Battaglini & Coate, 2008; G. M. Grossman & Helpman, 1994) . The distinction alluded to above is vital considering that our model focuses on authoritarian regimes. It also has important substantive implications that are explored below.
At this stage, it is easily seen from the expression for R ∑ that only an extremely future-orientated ruler would take no rents at time t, investing his entire surplus for that round. To rule out this empirically unlikely occurrence, we assume C5 is slack. We also assume constraints C1 to C4 are slack on the grounds that it is probably impractical for rulers to completely disinvest during their lifetimes. So we avoid discussion of corner solutions to the program, focusing on the properties of the internal solution.
Environmental quality at t + 1, 0 < t + 1 < T, is assumed to be a function of the environmental investment deficit D t+1 = (I t + i t ) − (E t + e t ), recalling that total factor levels at time t + 1 are the sum of the lagged value at t plus additional investments at t. The environmental quality function, ε t+1 (D t+1 ), is such that δε t+1 / δD t+1 < 0. In the appendix, we show that 4
where k t is the amount invested, excluding what is spent on private goods going to the selectorate. Then D t increases with I t , E t , and C t so long as αp E > βp I or α/p I > β/p E , which is to say that the productivity of surplus of infrastructural investment relative to its price is greater than that of environmental protection. 5 Because we can operationally measure state capacity, we focus discussion on this term. The larger the stock of state capacity C t , the lower the level of environmental quality at time t + 1, so long as the productivity of infrastructural investment relative to its price is greater than the productivity of environmental investment relative to its price. If we assume additionally that at relatively low levels of development, infrastructural investment is typically more productive of ruler surplus than environmental investment, 6 then:
Hypothesis 1: Other things equal, the higher the level of state capacity, the lower the level of environmental quality in authoritarian systems at relatively low levels of development.
The mechanism behind this result is as follows. Constraints are assumed slack so at the optimum the ruler equates the marginal productivity of surplus with respect to factors across his possible investments. Moreover, the marginal productivity of factors is declining, because of the "Cobb-Douglas" production function. The larger C t is, the lower is the marginal productivity of state capacity before investment/disinvestment. So the larger C t is, the further investment in infrastructure and the environment are pushed in equilibrium. 7 A greater stock of state capacity increases infrastructural investment and environmental protection, but the investment gap grows if infrastructural investment grows more in relative terms, which it will if it is relatively more productive of surplus. 8 Stated in more simple language, one key implication that emerges from the model's technical mechanism summarized above is that greater state capacity will rationally induce autocrats to increase investment in infrastructure and the environment. To see why, first note that increasing investment in infrastructure reduces intermediate input costs that raises economic output (World Bank, 2012) . Higher output that results from infrastructure investment not only generates more capital but also provides an opportunity for authoritarian rulers to extract more rent from the larger pool of capital realized from higher output. Because the authoritarian ruler in our model seeks to maximize his discounted rents, he thus has incentives to raise output via investment in infrastructure as this produces more rent for the ruler. This argument is similar to Gandhi and Przeworski's (2006) claim that dictators "always seek to maximize total output: even if they are forced to share rents with some groups of the potential opposition, their rents are higher when total output is higher" (p. 2). Note, however, that the authoritarian ruler's incentive to extract more rent by raising output via infrastructural investment is a necessary but not sufficient condition for increasing investment in infrastructure.
Rather our model predicts that greater state capacity provides the ruler with the necessary economic ability required to invest more in infrastructure which raises output and consequently leads to higher realized rent for the ruler. Furthermore, as the authoritarian ruler is less politically constrained than democratic leaders, he has sufficient political room for maneuver to employ greater state capacity to generate more rent by (as explicated above) raising output via increasing infrastructure investment. Our model also suggests that greater state capacity provides the ruler with more leverage to invest in the environment. Investing in the environment curtails production bottlenecks by reducing negative externalities, and this in turn further boosts output which generates more rent for the authoritarian ruler. Although greater state capacity has a positive effect on infrastructural and environmental investment, we find in our model that the environmental investment gap grows if-as discussed above-infrastructural investment grows more than environmental investment; this occurs when the former is relatively more productive of surplus.
In contrast to authoritarian rulers, democratic incumbents on average place more weight on maximizing social welfare rather than rent (Lake & Baum, 2001) . They are also more institutionally constrained by de facto opposition parties in the legislature whose policy preferences may diverge from the incumbents "ideal-point" and whose interests are unlikely to be consistent with maximizing the incumbent's discounted rents. As democratic leaders place more weight on increasing social welfare rather than rentextraction, their incentives to use state capacity to generate more rent by raising output are low compared with authoritarian rulers. Higher institutional constraints faced by democratic leaders also make it substantially more difficult for these leaders to employ state capacity to implement policies-for example, increasing investment in infrastructure and the environment-that they may prefer as opposition parties can credibly veto such policies. Thus, unlike authoritarian regimes, we anticipate that higher state capacity is likely to have a negligible and insignificant (in the statistical sense) impact on environmental investment gap in democracies.
Data and Measurement

Air and Water Pollution
To test the impact of the capacity of the state on the environment, we choose to focus on three major types of air and water pollution with available data covering enough countries and years: SO 2 , CO 2 , and BOD. 9 SO 2 is a serious air pollutant, implicated in ground-level smog and haze, particularly in urban areas. It is associated with damage to human health and reduces agricultural productivity. It often results in acid-deposition, which damages vulnerable aquatic and forest ecosystems and buildings (Hill, 2004) . Around two thirds of emissions result from fossil fuel-burning electricity generation. In developed countries, the trend has been toward reductions in emissions due to changes to less sulfurous fossil fuels, deindustrialization, domestic legislation such as the U.S. Clean Air Act of 1973, pollution control technologies encouraged by regional arrangements like the 1988 EU Large Combustion Plant Directive, and the international Convention of Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution. However, emissions are still increasing in rapidly growing developing countries many of which are authoritarian regimes. We measure SO 2 emissions in kilograms per capita per year. 10 We take the logarithm of all three dependent variables to rescale extreme values and approximate a normal distribution.
CO 2 is the most significant anthropogenic forcing factor for climate change. 11 Hence, it is also implicated in an enormous range of problems, including potential food scarcity, health, development, security, and loss of biodiversity. It has been under intense discussion since the late 1980s, primarily under the umbrella of the 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change. Despite the entering into force of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol in 2005, regional action such as the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, and action at state and local scales, policy has had little impact to date. We use CO 2 emissions in metric tons per capita from the World Bank's Development Indicators. Emissions have fallen in some countries since the 1980s partly as a consequence of shifts in fuel or closing polluting heavy industry.
BOD is an important indicator of water pollution, and it measures the amount of oxygen required to decompose a given amount of organic pollutant. Organic matter entering rivers and lakes is decomposed by microorganisms, and their activity depletes the oxygen dissolved in the water. Besides natural flows of organic matter, there are flows from sewage discharge and from industrial processes like paper production. These flows push up BOD, and in the extreme can lead to the water becoming hypoxic and unable to support life (Hill, 2004) . The measure we draw from World Bank Development Indicators is based on the standard test for this form of environmental stress, BOD in kilograms per day, per capita. This is, then, a measure of anthropogenic organic pollution of waterways. 12
State Capacity
To capture the concept of the capacity of the state, we use two different fiscal measures of state capacity from Arbetman-Rabinowitz and Johnson (2007): the state's tax revenue as a ratio of GDP (Tax ratio) and relative political capacity (RPC). 13 Tax ratio measures states' ability to extract resources from individuals and groups in society; it is the conventional gauge of the state's extractive capacity (Campbell, 1993; Cheibub, 1998; Thies, 2005 Thies, , 2010 . RPC further conceptualizes state's RPC as the "the ability of a government to extract resources from a population given their level of economic development" (Arbetman-Rabinowitz & Johnson, 2007, p. 2) . It is a measure of the strength of the state compared with other states with similar levels of development and resource endowments.
RPC is an index that compares the actual level of tax revenue extraction with a predicted level of extraction. Predicted revenues are estimated as a function of per capita income, the share of agriculture in the economy, the share of mining in the economy, and major oil production. A state that scores 1 on the RPC indicator is extracting exactly as one would expect compared with other states with similar conditions, while those that score higher than 1 are extracting more than expected and those that score lower than 1 are extracting less than expected. The RPC score was originally developed by Organski and Kugler (1980) as a proxy for states' relative ability to wage war, and has proven useful in conflict studies (Thies, 2010) and in recent work on carbon emissions (Sprinz, Aklin, Fuchs, & Meyer-Eppler, 2009 ).
Authoritarian Regime Types
Our theoretical model focuses the effect of state capacity in authoritarian states. We adopt a parsimonious approach in which the ruler's only incentive is to maximize the expected surplus that she can extract from the society. However, other factors might also systematically affect ruler's choice between infrastructures and environmental public goods. Geddes has shown that different authoritarian states constitute different political "games" for rulers and their key supporters by providing them with different incentive structures (Geddes, 1999) : for instance, in a single-party regime, factions within the party often play a stag hunt game, so it is better for them to stay in rather than leaving the party, which accounts for the resilience of this type of regime. It is plausible that systematic differences between these authoritarian regime types affect ruler's policy choices, including those affecting the environment. For instance, leaders in regimes that tend to last longer (e.g., singleparty regimes) might have a longer time horizon and therefore are more likely to care about the environment. In addition to time horizons (which are difficult to measure empirically), regime types might proxy other systematic differences between authoritarian systems such as the size of distributional coalitions (Chang & Golden, 2010; Peceny & Butler, 2004; Pickering & Kisangani, 2010; Wright, 2009 ). 14 It is therefore important for us to control for authoritarian regime types in the empirical analysis. We follow Geddes' typology of authoritarian regimes and use an extended version of the data from Wright (2008) . 15 There are some hybrid regimes coded in the data (e.g., military-personalist and single-party-military). These hybrid regimes might exhibit characteristics of two or more of the two pure regime types. Therefore, we choose to focus on the four pure types of authoritarian regime types to capture the authoritarian regime-type effects. 16
Socialist/Communist Legacies
Communist regimes have often adopted a progressivist perspective based on Marx and Engels' idea that the road to communism lies through the development of the forces of production. In practice, communist regimes tended to develop forces of production by investment in heavy industry, mining, and massive irrigation and hydro-electric projects. While the case study literature on communist regimes finds it difficult to disentangle this ideology from other variables such as relative under-development, it is frequently held to be one factor lying behind such problems as heavy air and water pollution in the Soviet Union (Oldfield, 2005) . Besides ideology, it is commonly held that Soviet central planning was wasteful of resources, because inputs and use of pollution sinks came un-priced to enterprises bent on plan fulfillment, and led to under-investment in cleaner plant, because of short-term pressures to maximize production (Ericson, 1991) . Another reason to control for communist legacies is that many single-party regimes are associated with communist/ socialist experience; we need to tease out the effect of communist legacies to make it a convincing case that it is the size of the constituencies (and state capacity) that impact the environment. 17 We therefore add a dummy variable indicating whether a country has ever been a communist or socialist regime. 18
Further Control Variables
We include GDP per capita (in purchasing power parity) and its squared term in the model to capture the possibility that there is a curvilinear relationship between wealth and environmental protection. This is to test the Environmental Kuznets Curve argument that there is a U-shaped relationship between economic development and environmental protection. Moreover, rapid economic growth may generate forms of environmental damage that are difficult to cope with in the short term. We therefore include GDP growth rate. Our model also includes the share of industrial production in GDP (Industry) because industry is often associated with higher levels of pollution than the service and agricultural sectors. We further control for Fuel exports (as a percentage of merchandise exports) given the negative environmental impacts associated with the exploration, drilling, and extraction of fossil fuels (O'Rourke & Connolly, 2003) .
We include two demographic variables, Population density (population divided by land area) and Urban population (as a share of total population) to control for demographic influences on pollution levels. Countries with high population density might prioritize development at the expense of environmental protection. Large urban population might also increase the environmental burden on the country; but urban population is also likely to be associated with environmental activism and protection. 19 We control for Trade openness (the sum of imports and exports as a percentage of GDP) which has been used extensively in the trade-environment literature to capture the effect of overall trade openness (de Soysa & Neumayer, 2005) .
Finally, any account of environmental politics will be incomplete without taking into account societal demands for more/less environmental protection. We, like many previous studies, have implicitly assumed that the public demands a cleaner environment. However, how strong that demand is and to what extent people are willing to give up part of their income for environmental protection is largely unknown, especially for many authoritarian states. It is therefore important to control for relative demand for environmental public goods. However, data on public opinion concerning environmental demand are limited, especially for developing countries (Kvaløy, Finseraas, & Listhaug, 2012) . 20 Income is probably the best available proxy. Indeed, this is another justification for including GDP per capita and its square term.
Another important societal demand is associated with the energy-intensive sectors and the common assumption is that these sectors prefer less stringent environmental regulations. For example, Ward and Cao (2012) have shown that in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) context, the larger the size of these sectors, the lower the level of environmental taxation in a country. Energy-intensive sectors can be identified, for instance, by reference to those included in the EU's CO 2 emissions trading scheme such as electricity generation, cement production, and glass making. In principle, the power of such sectors could be measured by their contribution to GDP, but available breakdowns of GDP are not fine enough to make this practicable. Things are more straightforward on the production side. We use the World Development Indicators (WDI) data on national energy production in kilotons of oil equivalent and divided by real GDP. This gives energy production per unit of real GDP (Energy production). Table 1 presents the correlation statistics for the variables used in the article.
Empirical Findings
We first model air and water pollution in a country random effects model with a first-order autoregressive process to capture the within-country serial correlation of the data. While the random effects in our model are conceptually analogous to the country-fixed effects usually employed in Time-Series-Cross-Sectional (TSCS) data analyses, they have certain statistical advantages. Unlike random effects models, fixed effects models use one degree of freedom for each unit. Such loss of information inflates the standard errors and makes the estimates of the coefficients less precise. This is important for our analysis because missing data (on RPC and Tax ratio, for example) already reduce the number of countries to 39 to 46 (time period 1980-2003) . More importantly, the authoritarian regime-type variables are often slow-moving or even time-invariant. It is well known that estimating country-fixed effects with slow-moving and time-invariant variables is often problematic. 21 The model can be written as y X i t i i t , , = + + + β β β 0 ξ , where β 0 is the population intercept, β i represents mean-zero random unit intercepts and is normally distributed, and Xβ is the linear covariates and an estimate of their impact on the dependent variable. Residuals are further decomposed as ξ i,t = ρξ i , t−1 + ϵ i,t , where ρ is the first-order autoregressive correlation term (AR1) and ϵ i,t follows the normal distribution N ( , ) 0 2 σ . We also include year-fixed effects to control for common exogenous shocks (e.g., sharp increases in international oil price) and region dummy variables to control any potential regional effects that might not be captured by the explanatory variables. 22 We present the empirical findings in Tables 2 to 4 with one table for each type of pollutant. We have two measures for state capacity here-RPC and Tax ratio (of GDP). Thus for each pollutant, we present two model specifications: each model specification includes basic social-economic control variables from GDP per capita to energy production, communist/socialist legacies, and region variables.
The results from SO 2 regressions (Table 2) show that there is a positive association between state extractive capacity, either measured by RPC or Tax ratio, and the logged level of SO 2 per capita emission for authoritarian states. Not only is the association statistically significant across both model specifications but also the magnitude of the association is substantively important. For instance, a coefficient of about 0.12 associated with the RPC measure suggests that on average, a one standard deviation upward shift in a country's RPC, which is about 0.54 in our sample of observations, is expected to be associated with an increase in annual SO 2 emissions of about 0.07 kg per capita in logarithm. Note that the average of SO 2 per capita emission in the sample is about 1.47 kg per capita in logarithm.
Interestingly, we also find an important effect for authoritarian regime types. With military regime as the baseline regime type, single-party regimes are associated with higher levels of SO 2 per capita emission. With coefficients of personalist regimes and monarchies not statistically different from that of the baseline military regimes, a coefficient around 0.8 associated with single-party regimes suggests that on a yearly basis, a single-party regime on average emits an additional 0.8 kg per capita (in logarithm) of SO 2 more than all other types of authoritarian regimes-this is more than half of the average SO 2 per capita emission level in the sample (again, the mean is about 1.47 kg per capita in logarithm). 23 Furthermore, GDP per capita and its square term are significantly associated with emission, and the signs of coefficients indicate an inverted U-shaped environmental Kuznets curve: per capita SO 2 emission goes up with wealth until reaching a threshold after which increasing 1980-2001 1980-1999 Year-fixed effects are estimated for all models but not reported because of space limit. SO 2 = sulfur dioxide; RPC = relative political capacity; AR1 = first-order autoregressive correlation term.
wealth decreases emission. Finally, urban population and energy production are also positively associated with SO 2 emission. Table 3 presents the empirical findings for CO 2 emission. In contrast to the case of SO 2 emissions, here we do not find evidence for an inverted U-shaped environmental Kuznets curve, though the negative impacts of urban population and energy production are still statistically significant. In terms of the effects of regime types, the relationship between single-party regimes and emission is not significant. Moreover, similar to the case of SO 2 emission, 1980-2003 1980-1999 Year-fixed effects are estimated for all models; not reported because of space limit. CO 2 = carbon dioxide; RPC = relative political capacity; AR1 = first-order autoregressive correlation term.
RPC and Tax ratio increase CO 2 emission significantly. In terms of the regional effects, with the baseline region being East Asia, we find that countries from South Asia emit significantly less CO 2 . Slightly different from the findings of two major air pollutants, those from BOD regressions (Table 4 ) suggest that few covariates in our model actually have any impact on this type of water pollution. Among all the control variables, we only find that GDP growth reduces and urban population increases 1980-2003 1980-1999 Year-fixed effects are estimated for all models; not reported because of space limit. BOD = biochemical oxygen demand; RPC = relative political capacity; AR1 = first-order autoregressive correlation term.
BOD per capita. We might simply need better quality data for BOD discharges: for the same time period and a similar set of countries, the available number of observations for the BOD regressions is almost one third lower than those in the SO 2 and CO 2 regressions. However, even with few observations, state extractive capacity measured as RPC and Tax ratio is still positively associated with BOD pollution. Our strongest finding is the positive effect of state capacity on pollution. To test whether this result is robust to other estimation strategies, we ran ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions with lagged dependent variable and country-and year-fixed effects. Adding country-fixed effects essentially makes our estimation rely exclusively on temporal variation in the data. A country's state capacity, at least for those two measures in our data, does not change much over time. Therefore, we think that a fixed effects model, by giving up cross-sectional variation of independent variables in explaining air and water pollution, is a stronger test for the state capacity argument. Moreover, we choose not to include regime-type variables and the dummy variable for communist/socialist regime because they are almost time-invariant. The results from fixed effects models are reported in Table 5 . Here, except for one out of the six model specifications-using RPC for SO 2 , we find that both measures of state capacity are still positively associated with pollutions at reasonably high statistical significance levels. 24 Finally, we have argued in the theoretical section that our model of environmental investment gap is specific to the context of authoritarian politics. Democratic politics would change the incentives of the ruler because democratic incumbents on average place more weight on maximizing social welfare rather than rent (Lake & Baum, 2001) . Moreover, they are more likely to be institutionally constrained by de facto opposition parties in the legislature whose policy preferences may diverge from the incumbents'. To empirically test our theoretical expectation, we add polity score and its interactive term with the state capacity variables to the fixed effects model specifications in Table 5 . An interactive model is ideal to test the domain restriction of our theory: If our model only works for non-democracies, we should see the positive effect of state capacity on pollution indicators disappear in democracies. Figure 1 shows the conditional effects of polity score on the state capacity variables across pollution types with mean estimates and confidence intervals. 25 Across all six sub-figures, we observe the same pattern that confirms our theoretical expectation. State capacity, measure either by RPC or Tax ratio, is positively associated with pollution when polity score is at the low and/or medium level. 26 The positive effects become smaller with increasing level of polity scores and eventually disappear (judging by the associated statistical significance indicated by the 95% confidence intervals) when .935
.943
Year-fixed effects 1980-1901 1980-1999 1980-1903 1980-1999 1981-1903 1981-1999 Year-and country-fixed effects are estimated for all models but not reported because of space limit. OLS = ordinary least squares; RPC = relative political capacity; SO 2 = sulfur dioxide; CO 2 = carbon dioxide; BOD = biochemical oxygen demand; DV = dependent variable. polity score reaches around −3 for SO 2 (Figure 1b) , and around 3 for CO 2 and BOD (Figure 1c-1f) . 27
Conclusion and Discussion on Future Research
In this article, we present a model of environmental politics in the authoritarian world. We show that it is typically the case that the larger the state's capacity, the worse its environmental quality: while infrastructural investment and environmental protection increase with higher state capacity, the former increases at a faster rate, which enlarges the environmental investment gap. Our theoretical model predicts that greater state capacity should be associated with bad environmental outcomes in the authoritarian regimes. We test our theory for three types of major air and water pollutants (SO 2 , CO 2 , and BOD). We find that state capacity is associated with higher levels of all three types of pollutants in authoritarian states. The findings presented in this article contribute to the literature on environmental politics and to a broader literature on the politics of development in numerous ways. First, some studies that address the debate on the impact of democracy on environmental pollution 28 find that democracies with greater state capacity are associated with higher environmental quality (Ehrhardt-Martinez, 2002; Janicke, 1997) . The central result in this article, however, suggests that unlike democracies, greater state capacity in autocracies generates a larger environmental investment gap that leads to more environmental degradation. This result at least partially challenges the conventional belief that higher state capacity in developing countries-where authoritarian regimes exist-promotes effective implementation of optimal policies (e.g., "better" environmental policies) that enhances social welfare (Herbst, 2000; Van de Walle, 2001) . Indeed, our study shows that the effect of state capacity on especially environmental outcomes critically depends on the institutional context, specifically the type of political regime in place.
Second, recent research provides valuable insights on how the impact of authoritarian regimes on outcomes as diverse as economic growth and the propensity for dictators to resort to conflict (e.g., Gandhi, 2008; Weeks, 2012; Wright, 2008) . Yet, extant studies on autocracies have paid less attention toward systematically theorizing the effect of autocratic states on a substantively important outcome: environmental quality. The results presented in this article take a critical step forward with respect to understanding how and when the quality of the environment can deteriorate in authoritarian regimes. As such, our main finding may provide a useful foundation for future research on the link between autocracies and environmental quality. Third, recall that a key assumption in our model is that the authoritarian ruler seeks to maximize his discounted rent. Notwithstanding this assumption, an additional claim that emerges from our model is that leaders in authoritarian states will invest in infrastructure even when they seek to maximize their expected rent. This claim calls into question extant theoretical arguments which posit that autocrats as "roving bandits" often fail to adequately provide public goods such as infrastructure investment primarily because they are more focused on being predatory by extracting rent (e.g., McGuire & Olson, 1996) . It may be worthwhile to assess whether our supplementary theoretical claim mentioned above is empirically valid.
The results reported in this article also provide two main policy predictions. First, our model predicts that environmental problems will get worse as a function of state capacity as long as infrastructural public goods investment is more productive of surplus than investment in environmental regulation. If there came a point where environmental regulation mattered more, the relationship reverses, though. This may shed some light on recent developments in China where the five-year plan for the period 2011 to 2015 has a strong environmental focus (BBC News, March 3, 2011) , and Premier Wen Jiabao announced a reduction in target growth rates from 7.5% to 7% partly to address environmental concerns (BBC News, February 28, 2011) .
There is no doubt that China faces enormous environmental challenges (World Bank, 2001) , partly due to its very rapid economic development over the last two decades. Some believe that poor environmental quality and resource shortages will increasingly constrain China's economic growth, while increasing environmental protest will generate strains for the regime (Economy, 2004; Grumbine, 2007) . It may be that China is on the cusp at which its considerable state capacity will turn to an advantage from the environmental point of view, reducing the environmental investment gap if it grows. Second, if the quality of the environment declines further in authoritarian regimes with greater state capacity, then leaders of such states may become more sensitized toward the long-term negative externalities of environmental degradation. If so, then we may potentially observe such autocratic leaders to be more receptive toward international policy initiatives that seek to curtail environmental pollution via multilateral cooperation between states at the systemic level.
There are many assumptions in our model that require further investigation. Not all authoritarian regimes can be plausibly characterized as pure rent-seekers (Wintrobe, 1990) . If a leader was purely concerned to maximize his chances of retaining tenure, increasing state capacity might be associated with worse environmental quality, but for different reasons to the ones we suggest. If the leader had to pay some attention to all members of the selectorate by paying them off with private goods, and if this necessitated building state capacity through time, we would expect greater pressure on the profits of enterprises in the private sector, damaging their ability to invest in cleaner technology. We might also expect direct environmental effects due to a bias toward current consumption and further attempts to suppress dissent among the general population, including environmental dissent.
Although there is certainly evidence from large-scale social surveys and from other sources for environmental concern in authoritarian systems (World Values Survey, 2009) , it is plausible that the degree of concern varies. If authoritarian leaders have to pay attention to dissent within the selectorate and (to some extent) among the wider citizenry, environmental demand should matter to their behavior, too, if they have the capacity to meet it. This suggests an interaction between demand and state capacity. As it is the case that a variety of causal mechanisms could explain our empirical results, detailed empirical work will be required to tell which are the most plausible. 29 Finally, we also found that single-party authoritarian states are positively associated with SO 2 emissions. It is beyond the scope of this article to study in greater detail the link between authoritarian regime types and environmental pollution. But researchers may gain valuable insights by evaluating how different authoritarian institutions may influence environmental quality.
Noting that Π T−1 > 0 (because Π 0 = 1 and π t > 0) and ϕ T−1 > 0 (as ϕ > 0), we can simplify the right-hand side by dividing through by these terms and recall that Π T = Π T−1 π T−1 to derive:
Summarizing, we have shown that (a) δY T−1 / δi T−2 = p I (1 − ϕπ T−2 ) / ϕπ T−2 ; and if for all t″ such that t′ + 1 ≤ t″ ≤ T − 2, δY t″+1 / δi t″ = p I (1 − ϕπ t″ ) / ϕπ t″ , then it follows that (b) δY t′+1 / δi t′ = p I (1 − ϕπ t′ ) / ϕπ t′ . We conclude by backward induction that for 0 ≤ t ≤ T − 2 δY t+1 / δi t = p I (1 − ϕπ t ) / ϕπ t .
Using analogous arguments, we can show that δY T / δe T−1 = p E / ϕπ T−1 and
Thus for 0 ≤ t ≤ T − 1, the ratio of the partial derivatives of surplus in the next period with respect to investments is equal to the ratio of the price of the investments. Specifically, 
Suppose that the ruler's total investment in infrastructure, environment, and state capacity is k t , so that p I i t + p E e t + p C c t = k t or
Then solving (1) through (4) violations, and adopt administrative policies, all of which undermine enforcement effectiveness of policies (Cao & Prakash, 2012) . And we expect that the gap between law on paper and environmental outcomes is likely to be large especially for developing countries. 10. See Stern (2005) . 11. Other pollutants have greater forcing potential per unit, though. 12. Inorganic pollution, for instance, that due to run-off of nitrates and phosphates from agriculture, may also deplete oxygen by generating algal blooms, but biochemical oxygen demand (BOD) is not a direct measure of this, and we know of no internationally comparable data. 13. Other measures of state capacity are also often used in the literature, such as government consumption and government total revenue. However, we think these alternative measures are problematic for our purposes. Government consumption is a measure of the amount of a society's resources consumed by government. It measures expenditures, rather than revenue-gathering activity. Total government revenue is a measure of the government's income that includes tax and nontax revenue. It is not typically seen as the best measure of revenue extraction, because it contains non-tax revenue. 14. Rulers lacking easily available revenue such as foreign aid or rents from natural resources are often under considerable pressure when they need to provide payoffs to members of large distributional coalitions. They are more likely to over-exploit natural resources and the environment to survive. 15. Note that Geddes originally offered a straightforward classification of regimes as military, personalist, and single party: in military regimes, a group of officers decides who will rule and influence policy; in single-party regimes, one party dominates access to political office and controls policy; in personalist regimes, access to office and the fruits of office depends on the discretion of an individual leader. The original data spanned from 1950 to 2000, but did not include monarchies and only included data on regimes that endured more than 3 years. Wright (2008) updated the Geddes data to include monarchies, such as Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and Kuwait. 16. Between 1946 and , roughly 22% of the total observations are coded as hybrid regimes; so we are not losing too many observations. More importantly, our key finding concerning the positive relationship between state capacity and pollution is robust to the inclusion of these hybrid regimes. 17. The correlation between communist legacies and single-party regime is indeed .45 in our data. 18. Countries that have been coded 1 for this dummy variable and potentially enter the empirically analysis after deletion of missing data are Albania, Bulgaria, China, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Laos, Mozambique, Angola, Cambodia, Vietnam, Somalia, and Afghanistan. 19. Data on GDP per capita, GDP growth rate, industrial production, oil exports, population density, and urban population are from the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2008 ). 20. The World Values Survey and European Value Survey are the best sources for public opinion data on environmental demand in terms of country and year coverage. These surveys have a number of questions relating to the environment, depending on wave and country concerned (World Values Survey, 2009 ). However, the number of authoritarian country-years covered by these surveys is very limited. 21. Even though recent literature has proposed statistical tools to deal with this, see for example, Plümper and Troeger (2007) , there is still debate on whether the proposed estimators indeed solve the problem and about which estimator(s) outperform the others (Greene, 2010 ; but also see Plümper & Troeger, 2011) . 22. The region dummies are East Asia, Eastern Europe and post-Soviet, Latin America, North Africa and Middle East, South-East Asia, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa. 23. In terms of the potential explanations for the positive relationship between single-party regimes and sulfur dioxide (SO 2 ) emissions, we think this might be a function of the size of the key constituencies associated with authoritarian regimes. Among all four types of authoritarian regimes, single-party regimes are often associated with the largest size of key constituencies which mainly include the military and party members. For example, there are about 77.9 million (in 2009) members of the Chinese Communist Party, which is roughly 6% of the population; the Communist Party of Vietnam has 3.6 million members: roughly 4% of the population. Notoriously, the Institutional Revolutionary Party in Mexico also included quite large groups of farmers and trade unions in the movement. Larger key constituencies require more payoffs, often in the form of private goods, from the ruler assuming that she or he wants to stay in power and the best way to do so is to keep these constituencies happy. Higher level of private good provisions often implies a reduction in public goods which might also include the environmental type-this might cause the reduction in environmental qualities. 24. Also note that in the case of SO 2 and CO 2 (carbon dioxide), the sizes of estimated mean coefficients for state capacity variables in fixed effects models are smaller than those from random effects models. However, in the case of BOD, the estimated mean coefficients for state capacity variables are similar in size in random and fixed effects models. This seems to suggest that cross-sectional variation in the state capacity variables accounts much more for the variation in air pollution (SO 2 and CO 2 ) than that in water pollution (BOD). 25. We have included an online appendix with more details on testing the domain restriction of our theory at authors' websites. 26. This positive relationship is also statistically significant except when we use relative political capacity (RPC) for the case of SO 2 (Figure 1a ). 27. Polity score is bounded between −10 and 10 with higher values indicating more democratic systems. The common cutoff point for democracies often used in previous studies is a polity score of 6 and that for autocracies −6. The middle category is often referred to as anocracies. 28. See, for example, Li and Reuveny (2006) , Scruggs (2009) , and Bernauer and Koubi (2009) . 29. A more direct test of our causal story is to look at the correlations between state capacity and regimes types on one hand, and government spending patterns across different types of public goods on the other hand. More specifically, the differences between government spending on economic affairs (e.g., on mining, mineral resources, manufacturing, and construction) and the environment can be operationalized as the environmental investment gap variable. However, data on government environmental spending (e.g., from International Monetary Fund's [IMF] Government Financial Statistics) are often missing, especially for developing countries and for the pre-1990s period.
